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1. INTRODUCTION
On April 15, 1994, the contracting parties to the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT")1 finalized the "Uru-
guay Round" of trade negotiations.2 The agreement reached as
part of these negotiations is perhaps the most comprehensive in
history, lowering yearly global tariffs by over $700 billion,4
while increasing world income by over $500 billion per year.'
The Agreement and the new World Trade Organization
("WTO")6 it creates have already received considerable attention
* Professor of Management, Texas A&M University.
Hugh Roy Cullen Chair and Professor of Finance, Texas A&M
University.
Texas Commerce Bank Professor of Finance, Texas A&M University.
1 See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. All,
T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT 1947].
2 See Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of
Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS -
RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 1 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994).
[hereinafter GATT 1994].
3 See Results of the Uruguay Round Trade Negotiations: Hearings Before the
Senate Comm. on Fin., 103d Cong. 211 (1994) (statement of U.S. Trade
Representative Mickey Kantor).
' See The New Trade Pact, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 1994, at A22 (highlighting
Clinton administration estimates that global tariffs will go down by $744
billion).
5 See G. Richard Shell, Trade Legalism and International Relations Theory:
An Analysis of the World Trade Organization, 44 DUKE LJ. 829, 831 & n.3
(1995). Shell cites a 1994 report by the GATT Secretariat projecting a $510
billion increase, measured in 1992 dollars, to occur before the year 2005. See
id. (citing GATT SECRETARIAT, THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND -
MARKET ACCESS FOR GOODS AND SERVICES: OVERVIEW OF THE RESULTS 12
(1994)).
6 See GATT 1994, supra note 2, art. 1, 33 I.L.M. at 1144 (establishing the
WTO). See generally Shell, supra note 5 (giving an overall analysis of the
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in leading legal periodicals. This journal hosted a symposium on
"Current Issues in the World Trade Organization" last spring to
examine a number of controversial topics already created by the
WTO.7 Elsewhere, in recent articles in the Harvard Law Review,
Professor Laurence H. Tribe and Professors Bruce Ackerman and
David Golove debate the legitimacy of the process by which the
U.S. Congress ratified the Uruguay Round of GATT and the
general constitutionality of "congressional-executive agreements. " '
Additionally, in a recent article in the Duke Law Journal,
Professor G. Richard Shell extensively examines the theoretical
underpinnings of the new WTO and its dispute resolution
system.9
Commentators have paid little attention, however, to the
precise economic impacts of this massive change in international
trade regulation. This Article focuses on these impacts. It does
so by observing the nature of the changes affected by the Uruguay
Round as well as the reactions in markets throughout the world
to events leading up to Uruguay Round ratification. Section 2
outlines a theory of "event study analysis" involving observations
of international stock market reactions to publicized events.
Section 3 examines the major changes that the Uruguay Round
makes in the international trade regime and predicts certain logical
economic impacts. Section 4 reveals the results of applying the
"event study analysis" to different regions and industries in the
WTO).
' See Wesley A. Cann, Jr., Internationalizing Our Views Toward Recoup-
ment and Market Power: Attacking the Antidumping/Antitrust Dichotomy
Through WTO-Consistent Global Welfare Theory, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L.
69 (1996); Steve Charnovitz, Participation of Nongovernmental Organizations in
the World Trade Organization, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 331 (1996); Philip
M. Nichols, Extension of Standing in World Trade Organization Disputes to
Nongovernment Parties, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 295 (1996); G. Richard
Shelf, The Trade Stakeholders Model and Participation by Nonstate Parties in the
World Trade Organization, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 359 (1996); Jared R.
Silverman, Comment, Multilateral Resolution Over Unilateral Retaliation:
Adjudicating the Use of Section 301 Before the WTO, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON.
L. 233 (1996); see also Curtis Reitz, Enforcement of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 555 (1996) (offering commentary
on and suggestions for improving the new enforcement mechanisms).
I See Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108
HARV. L. REV. 799 (1995); Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure
Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108
HARV. L. REV. 1221 (1995).
" See Shell, supra note 5.
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world. Ultimately, this Article concludes that the long-term
nature of the impacts will redound mostly to the benefit of the
Asian/Pacific economic region.
2. EVENT STUDY ANALYSIS
One of the best ways to gain insight into the economic
implications of regulatory changes such as the GATT/WTO is
through stock market event analysis.1 ° This type of analysis
involves examining the impact of a given event or events on stock
prices in various markets throughout the world. This analysis
assumes, pursuant to the so-called "efficient markets hypothe-
ses, " 12 that all present and future economic implications of given
events are immediately reflected in stock prices throughout
relevant markets. Stock market event analysis is designed to
measure the effect of an event on stock prices independently of
the effects of other factors. To achieve this goal, estimates of the
normal "expected return" of stock prices are calculated and then
compared with the actual post-event returns. The difference,
referred to as the "abnormal return," is attributed to the given
event. 
13
In distinguishing between expected and abnormal returns,
event analysis focuses on two time periods: (1) the "estimation
period" prior to the event, during which a regression model
designed to measure the normal relationship between the world
stock index and the stock index of a particular country or
10 See generally ROBERT C. RADCLIFFE, INVESTMENT: CONCEPTS,
ANALYSIS, STRATEGY (2d ed. 1987) (outlining a recommended process for
investors to evaluate the advantages of capital investments requiring prospective
speculation about the long-term impacts of current events); Leonard Bierman
et al., Denmark and the Maastricht Treaty: A Market Analysis, 3 DUKE J. COMP.
& INT'L L. 147 (1992) (conducting a similar empirical analysis of market reac-
tions to the Danish vote ratifying the Maastricht Treaty).
n See Bierman et al., supra note 10, at 147.
12 See SEHA M. TINIC & RICHARD R. WEST, INVESTING IN SECURITIES:
AN EFFICIENT MARKETS APPROACH 278-79 (1979) [hereinafter TINIC & WEST]
(explaining the "efficient markets" approach to investing); Eugene F. Fama et
al., The Adjustment of Stock Prices to New Information, 10 INT'L. ECON. REV.
1, 12-16 (1969) (discussing the speed of adjustment of stock prices to specific
kinds of new information); Daniel Seligman, Can You Beat the Stock Market?,
FORTuNE, Dec. 26, 1983, at 82 (debating the efficient market hypothesis).
13 Stock markets will always experience general price movements regardless
of the given event or events. Thus, it is necessary to isolate the impact of the
given event from the impact of other pricing factors.
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industry is developed; and (2) the "analysis period," which
encompasses a small number of days immediately surrounding the
given event day. The market model version of the capital asset
pricing model14 is commonly used to estimate these relationships
and is used in the study discussed in this Article.
There was considerable controversy in the U.S. Congress
during 1994 regarding ratification of the Uruguay Round of the
GATT.5 This controversy extended far beyond the aforemen-
tioned constitutional debate between Professor Tribe and
Professors Ackerman and Golove regarding whether the agree-
ment was a "treaty" subject to two-thirds ratification by the U.S.
Senate. 6 Concerns regarding congressional ratification of the
Uruguay Round came from various sectors.
First, because the Uruguay Round reduces tariffs, critics
expressed concern regarding the loss of approximately $10 billion
in tariff revenue that the United States will experience during the
first five years of the agreement."' Opponents of the agreement
also noted the likely negative impact its less restrictive trade
mandates would have on U.S. jobs, particularly in such industries
14 See TINIG & WEST, supra note 12, at 278-79 (discussing the theory behind
the capital asset pricing model); see also William F. Sharpe, Capital Asset Prices:
A Theory of Market Equilibrium Under Conditions of Risk, 19 J. FIN. 425, 427
(1964) (presenting an example of a capital asset pricing model).
15 See, e.g., Peter H. Stone, GA7T-ling Guns, NAT'L. J., July 2, 1994, at
1571 (discussing the lobbying efforts related to the ratification of the GATT);
Michael J. Boskin, Pass GA 7T Now, FORTUNE, Dec. 12, 1994, at 137 (urging
Congressional Republicans to put politics aside and pass GATT); GATT
Imperiled, Bus. WEEK, Oct. 31, 1994, at 57 (detailing President Clinton's
concern regarding GATT's chances for ratification success); Senate Support orPact on World Trade Is Low, WALL ST. J., Nov. 14, 1994, at A2 [hereinafter
Senate Support] (reporting on the statement of Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan
that GATT lacked the necessary support to achieve ratification).
16 See Ackerman & Golove, supra note 8; Tribe, supra note 8; see also
GA TT Implementing Legislation: Hearings on S. 2467 Before the Senate Comm.
On Commerce, Science, and Transp., 103d Cong. 285-339 (1994) (containing
statements and testimony of Prof. Laurence H. Tribe and Prof. Bruce
Ackerman arguing that because the results of the Uruguay Round constitute a
treaty, they must be subject to Senate approval by a two-thirds majority). Al-
though the latter view finally prevaileda, the pact's revenue-losing provisions
required a larger majority (60 members) in the U.S. Senate. See Senate Support,
supra note 15, at A2.
17 See Boskin, supra note 15, at 138 (estimating the loss as likely to be $12
billion); Stone, supra note 15, at 1572 (citing a $10 billion loss).
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as textiles,18 and on the integrity of U.S. labor and environmen-
tal standards.1 9 The most vociferous opposition to the agree-
ment, however, focused on its creation of the WTO to regulate
trade disputes, and the corresponding potential encroachment on
U.S. legal "sovereignty."" An anti-ratification campaign entitled
"Save Our Sovereignty" was launched in May of 1994.21 This
campaign enjoyed considerable success in convincing various
legislators that the WTO and its dispute resolution process posed
a major threat to the United States' ability to enforce and
maintain its own laws.'
This political controversy throughout 1994 placed the Agree-
ment's ultimate approval by the U.S. Congress, considered the
linchpin for the agreement's ratification by other major coun-
tries,' in continual doubt. Indeed, resolution of the issue was
not clear until the U.S. Senate's December 1, 1994, vote approving
the Agreement. 24 The U.S. House of Representatives passed a
similar resolution just two days earlier.' Throughout the
process, the probability of ultimate congressional approval
vacillated dramatically.
At least four dates prior to the final vote are noteworthy: (1)
August 15, 1994, when major newspapers reported that the
"S See Stone, supra note 15, at 1572-74 (claiming that the textiles industry
is likely to lose "hundreds of thousands" of jobs if te agreement is approved).
19 See id. at 1572, 1574 (noting that many U.S. environmental and labor
laws could suffer from legitimacy attacks under a strengthened GATT system).
2 See id. at 1572 (stating that "[c]ritics fear that the WTO - where all 117
nations will have equal votes and vetoes will no longer be possible - could
infringe on U.S. sovereignty").
21 See John Harwood, GA 7T Backers are Given Edge in the Senate, WALL
ST. J., Dec. 1, 1994, at A3 (quoting Senator Robert Byrd of West Virginia as
stating that the WTO will be a "Tyrannosaurus" that will "ransack" U.S. laws);
Stone, supra note 15, at 1574 (noting concerns of Senator John F. Kerry of
Massachusetts regarding the impact of the WTO on U.S. laws).
n See Stone, supra note 15, at 1574.
See generally Boskin, supra note 15, at 137 (noting that the European
Community, Japan and other nations were waiting to see if the U.S. Congress
would pass GATT before acting on ratification).
24 See H.R. 5110, 103d Cong. (1994) (enacted) (setting forth the text of the
resolution); Helene Cooper & John Harwood, Major Sh i in Trade are Ensured
as GATT Wins Key Senate Vote, WALL ST. J., Dec. 2, 1994, at A12 (reporting
on the Senate's approval of GATT).
s See John Harwood & Helene Cooper, House Clears GA TTAccord In 288-
147 Vote, WALL ST. J., Nov. 30, 1994, at Al.
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Clinton Administration and House Republicans had reached a
compromise regarding the President's authority to link environ-
mental and labor standards to trade agreements, thereby greatly
enhancing prospects for the ratification of GATT;26 (2) Septem-
ber 21, 1994, when the Wall Street Journal reported that House
and Senate negotiators had reached an important accord on the
world trade pact;V (3) September 30, 1994, when U.S. Senate
Commerce Committee Chairman Ernest Hollings of South
Carolina, a key opponent of the agreement, agreed to allow a
Senate vote on the measure in early December of 1994;2' and (4)
November 22, 1994, when a major compromise deal between
President Clinton and Senate Majority Leader Robert Dole
regarding the role of the WTO became public, thus removing a
major stumbling block to GATT ratification. 29 The importance
of these dates to the ultimate success of GATT 1994 marks them
as "events" for purposes of testing world stock market reactions.
3. EVENT STUDY HYPOTHESES
3.1. Changes in the GATT System by the Uruguay Round
3.1.1. Overview
The Uruguay Round of GATT represents a massive liberaliza-
tion of international trade, cutting tariffs on thousands of articles
by approximately forty percent and mandating the removal of
significant import restrictions throughout the world.30 Interna-
tional trade theory generally predicts that such a multilateral
26 See Helene Cooper, White House Compromises on GA TT With House
Republicans to Ease Passage, WALL ST. J., Aug. 15, 1994, at A2.
2 See Bob Davis, GA TT Pact Moves Forward In Congress as House, Senate
Negotiators End Work, WALL ST. J., Sept. 21, 1994, at A4.
2 See David Rogers & Bob Davis, Senators Pledge December Vote on GA TT
Pact, WALL ST. J., Sept. 30, 1994, at A2.
29 See Bob Davis & David Rogers, Clinton, Dole Are Close to Deal Seeking
to Assure Critics of World-Trade Pact, WALL ST. J., Nov. 22, 1994, at A26.
30 See Harwood & Cooper, supra note 25, at Al (reporting that the
agreement wil reduce tariffs by 40%); Alan Riding, One Hundred Nine Nations
Sign Trade Agreement, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 1994, at 35, 48 (detailing the
required reductions in import restrictions); see generally Bob Davis, A Primer
on GAT: Sure, it's Tedious, But the Important Things Often Are, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 28, 1994, at A3 (outlining key questions and answers regarding the
changes made by the Uruguay Round).
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liberalization of trade policies will increase economic efficiency
and enhance economic growth for all signatory countries.3'
Indeed, the Uruguay Round is expected to increase world income
by over $500 billion per year.32  Consequently, one would
probably expect markets in all areas of the world to react
positively to events signaling a likely agreement of this kind.
Nevertheless, it is reasonable to expect the Uruguay Round to
have some disparate impacts on different nations, regions, and
economic sectors throughout the world. These impacts will be
precipitated, in part, by the interplay between substantive changes
embodied in certain specific provisions of the Uruguay Round
agreement.
3.1.2. Specific Provisions
3.1.2.1. Tariff Reductions
As noted above, the Uruguay Round will cut tariffs on a wide
array of products by about forty percent.3 For example, in
Europe the tariff on computers dropped from 4.9% to 2.5% as a
result of the Uruguay Round, while the average fourteen percent
tariff on imported computer chips dropped to approximately eight
percent.34  Tariff reductions on computers helps companies
exporting computers to Europe by lowering the tariffs charged on
their products. Companies manufacturing computers in Europe
also benefit because lower tariffs on imported computer chips
means lower costs of raw materials.35 Over time, the Uruguay
Round slashes tariffs on thousands of items, and even eliminates
them altogether with respect to certain goods.36 The agreement
31 See U.S. International Trade Commission, Potential Impact on the U.S.
Economy and Selected Industries of the GA 77 Uruguay Round Agreements, June,
1994, 1-9 (unpublished study, available from the U.S. International Trade
Commission). [hereinafter ITC Study].
32 See Shell, supra note 5, at 831 & n.3.
31 See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
31 See Many Business Leaders See Long-Term Gain, Especially at Computer,
Dru, Farming Firms, WALL ST. J., Dec. 2, 1994, at A6 [hereinafter Many
Business Leaders].
35 See id.
31 See Trade Pact's Key Provisions, WALL ST. J., Dec. 2, 1994, at A6.
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thus gives an especially big boost to companies and countries that
are major exporters. 7
3.1.2.2. Elimination of Import Restrictions
The agreement takes major steps toward the reduction and/or
elimination of import restrictions with respect to both industrial
and agricultural goods.3" Perhaps most significant in this regard
is the ten-year phasing out of the Multifiber Arrangement
("MFA"), a system of quotas that limits imports of textiles and
apparel into the United States and other industrialized coun-
tries.39 According to some estimates, world trade in textiles and
apparel may increase by as much as sixty percent once the MFA
phase out is completed.40
3.1.2.3. Subsidies
The Uruguay Round agreement places limits on government
subsidies of certain economic activities, 41 particularly in the
agricultural sector.42 For example, the Uruguay Round reduces
export subsidies and government budgetary support for agriculture
by thirty-six percent in "developed" countries and twenty-four
percent in "developing" countries.43 The agreement restricts
subsidies to tropical agricultural products even further.44
3.1.2.4. Intellectual Property Rights
The Uruguay Round agreement stipulates that all signatories
will adopt intellectual property protection in copyrights, trade-
marks, patents, industrial designs, layout designs of integrated
circuits, geographical indications, and undisclosed information.45
17 See Many Business Leaders, supra note 34, at A6 (speculating that some of
the biggest winners could be companies like K-Mart, Compaq, Mattel, Georgia-
Pacific, Caterpillar, and Microsoft).
31 See ANNE 0. KRUEGER, TRADE POLICIES AND DEvELOPING NATIONS
50 (1995).
'9 See Trade Pact's Key Provisions, supra note 36, at A6.
40 See KRUEGER, supra note 38, at 51.
41 See Trade Pact's Key Provisions, supra note 36, at A6.
42 See KRUEGER, supra note 38, at 51.
43 See id. at 51-52.
1 See id. at 51.
41 See id. at 52 & n.28.
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This provision represented a "big win" for worldwide pharmaceu-
tical, software, film, and book publishing industries which have
consistently registered complaints about international piracy.'
Under the agreement, however, developing countries will have
considerably more time to implement intellectual property rights
than developed countries. 47
3.1.2.5. Trade in Services
With technological advances reducing transportation and
communication costs and time, trade in services has increased in
importance relative to trade in goods.4' The Uruguay Round
brings trade in services under the multilateral negotiating umbrella
of the GATT/WTO, and further negotiations in various areas can
be expected.49  The Uruguay Round does not, however, include
any immediate substantive changes in this area. For example, U.S.
negotiators failed in their attempt to gain access for U.S. banks
and securities firms to markets in Japan and other key coun-
tries."0
3.2. "Competitiveness" Issues
3.2.1. Overview
It thus appears that various specific provisions of the Uruguay
Round clearly will impact certain industries, nations, and regions
differently. In a general sense, however, the agreement's provi-
sions liberalizing world trade will be most beneficial to those
countries in a competitive position to take advantage of new
trading opportunities. Moreover, because many of the trade-
liberalizing aspects of GATT will be phased in several years after
the Agreement's January 1, 1995, effective date," the countries
most likely to benefit will probably be those in the best competi-
46 Trade Pact's Key Provisions, supra note 36, at A6.
47 See KRUEGER, supra note 38, at 52.
11 See id. at 55.
" See Trade Pact's Key Provisions, supra note 36, at A6.
50 See id.
"1 See GATT 1994, supra note 2, pt. I, para. 3, 33 I.L.M. at 12 (recognizing
the negotiators' desire to make GATT effective as of January 1, 1995).
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tive position a decade or more from now. 2 Consequently,
although today's top competitors will receive some benefit from
the Agreement, one would predict that tomorrow's most competi-
tive countries will benefit most from the Uruguay Round.
3.2.2. Measuring Current Competitiveness
One of the best measures of current national competitiveness
is national output or Gross Domestic Product ("GDP") per
capita. 3 This measure encapsulates the quality and availability
of production inputs, as well as the impact of government and
other policies.54 A 1995 national output ranking of the major
nations of the world using an index5 provided the following
results:
CHART ONE
Current Competitiveness
United States 100
Switzerland 92
Singapore 88
Top 25% of Canada 83
Countries Japan 82
Ranked France 78
Australia 75
Austria 75
Belgium 74
Italy 73
52 For example, the phase out of the MFA under the Uruguay Round
occurs over a ten-year period and is heavily "backloaded," as most of the quota
restrictions will not be lifted until the years 2000 through 2005. See KRUEGER,
supra note 38, at 51.
53 See International Competitiveness Revisited, UBS INT'L FIN., Winter 1996,
at 1, 2 [hereinafter International Competitiveness].
51 See id. at 2.
" Since the United States received the highest score, the survey arbitrarily
gave it a benchmark score of 100.
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CHART ONE
Current Competitiveness
United Kingdom 73
Netherlands 72
Germany 72
Top 50% of Sweden 70
Countries New Zealand 63
Ranked Israel 61
Spain 53
Ireland 50
Korea 43
Portugal 40
Argentina 38
Malaysia 37
Chile 34
Top 75% of Greece 33
Countries Thailand 28
Ranked Mexico 27
Hungary 26
Brazil 23
Columbia 23
Poland 21
Turkey 20
Russia 16
Egypt 14
Indonesia 13
All Countries South Africa 11
Ranked China 10
Iran 9
Pakistan 9
Nigeria 6
India 5
From the perspective of current competitiveness, one would
expect many of the world's industrialized powers to benefit from
the Uruguay Round. In particular, the United States, Canada, the
European Community, and Japan seem well-poised to capitalize
on new economic opportunities afforded by the Uruguay Round.
3.2.3. Future Competitiveness
Although immediate opportunities under the Uruguay Round
are significant, because many of its provisions do not become
effective for many years, and it will be in effect for a long time,
the question of future national competitiveness is also critically
important. Because economic growth is ultimately driven by
1996]
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investment, and generally most investment is funded domestically,
examination of gross domestic savings as a percentage of GDP is
one good predictor of future competitiveness.56 In this regard,
the United States, although currently the world's most competi-
tive country, only has a domestic savings rate of about fifteen
percent.5' Singapore, China, Korea, Indonesia, Thailand, and
Japan on the other hand, all have savings rates of thirty percent
or more.58 Chart Two below illustrates the domestic savings
rates for nineteen key countries.59
56 See International Competitiveness, supra note 53, at 3 (concluding that
domestic investment in excess of 30% combined with domestic savings in excess
of 30% will render a country exceptionally competitive in the future).
57 See id.
58 See id.
59 See id.
[Vol. 17:3
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol17/iss3/2
MARKET PERSPECTIVE
Another major component of future competitiveness is the
ability to create and adopt new technology.' A variety of
factors, such as percentage of GDP devoted to research and
development and the export of manufactured goods, serve as
proxies for a nation's potential technological openness. 61  A
recent survey of eighteen countries ranked Singapore, Malaysia,
Israel, Thailand, and China highest in terms of technological
openness. 62 It is interesting to note that four out of these five
countries are in East Asia.63 Chart Three below illustrates the
breakdown. 64
60 See id. at 4.
61 See id.
62 See id. at 5.
63 See id. (demonstrating that technology is acquired mostly through import
of capital goods and that East Asian "openness to technology" puts them in a
leading position).
64 See id. Because Singapore ranked highest, the survey arbitrarily gave it
an index of 100 points. See id.
CHART THREE
Index of Technological Openness
(Singapore = 100 points)
:Ni
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
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Other factors, particularly those of a macro economic nature
including percentage of government consumption of GNP and
real rates of exchange, also figure into calculating potential future
national competitiveness. 5 Chart Four below sets forth a recent
comprehensive calculation of the potential future national
competitiveness of forty different countries: 66
CHART FOUR
Future Competitiveness
(Maximum points = 100)
Singapore 96
Top 15% of Malaysia 91
Countries Thailand 83
Ranked China 83
Japan 81
Korea 78
Top 25% of Ireland 76
Countries Switzerland 75
Ranked Indonesia 75
Netherlands 72
Germany 71
Belgium 68
Austria 67
Top 50% of France 67
Countries Sweden 66
Ranked Canada 63
United States 62
Italy 62
United Kingdom 60
New Zealand 60
65 See id. at 7.
66 See id.
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CHART FOUR
Future Competitiveness
(Maximum points = 100)
Chile 59
Australia 59
Israel 57
Top 75% of Spain 57
Countries Russia 55
Ranked India 52
Argentina 52
South Africa 52
Mexico 50
Colombia 49
Hungary 49
Pakistan 47
Portugal 47
Egypt 46
All Countries Brazil 44
Ranked Poland 41
Nigeria 39
Iran 39
Greece 36
Turkey 33
It is interesting to note that all of the countries in the top 15%
of the future competitiveness ranking are in Asia, while various
countries like the United States and Canada, which are currently
extremely competitive, drop close to the middle of the pack. 67
Thus, if the Uruguay Round agreement is predicted to have its
greatest impact in years to come, the top future competitors, all
Asian countries, are likely to be its greatest beneficiaries.
3.3. Industry Impacts
As noted above, the Agreement impacts specific industries
around the world.68 New intellectual property rights regulations
should significantly benefit pharmaceutical, software, and related
companies. Indeed, a comprehensive U.S. International Trade
67 See id.
6 See supra notes 3147 and accompanying text.
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Commission study ("ITC study") regarding the potential impact
of the agreement on U.S. industries predicted that the U.S.
pharmaceutical industry will be the only U.S. industry likely to
experience a sizable69 positive net trade effect as a result of the
accord.70 The agreement's gradual elimination of the MFA is
also likely to greatly impact the textiles and apparel industries.1
Elimination of the MFA will enable lower-cost producers of
textiles and apparel to gain access to new markets, allowing
consumers in these markets to purchase products at lower prices.
This may hurt higher-cost producers of these goods in the same
markets.72 The ITC study predicts that the relatively high-cost
U.S. textile and apparel industry will suffer the most of any U.S.
industry from the results of the Uruguay Round.73 According
to the study, the U.S. textile and apparel industry will experience
a sizable negative net trade effect due to the accord.74
Worldwide reductions in national government export subsidies
mandated by the Uruguay Round should greatly benefit agricul-
tural exporters.7s The ITC study predicted modest net trade
effects76 for U.S. exporters of fruits and vegetables as well as
grain and animal feed.77
4. EVENT STUDY RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
4.1. Overview/Aggregate Results
Table One sets forth the prediction errors for the overall stock
markets of the United States, Canada, and Mexico.78  It also
69 The ITC study considered an impact of more than 15% to be "sizable."
See ITC Study, supra note 31, at 1-7.
70 See id. at xx.
71 See supra notes 36-40 and accompanying text.
72 See generally ITC Study, supra note 31, at xix (outlining the impact of
multilateral trade liberalization under Uruguay Round Agreements on exports
and imports).
71 See id.
'4 See id. at xx.
s See supra notes 38-44 and accompanying text.
76 The ITC study characterizes an effect between 5% and 15% as "modest."
See ITC Study, supra note 31, at 1-7.
77 See id. at xx.
71 See infra Table One.
For our purposes, prediction error is calculated as follows:
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provides aggregated stock market statistics for North America as
a whole, the Asian/Pacific region, and Europe.79 Market statis-
tics are based on "Dow Jones Equity" indices reported daily in the
Wall Street Journal.8 0 The recent nature of the "events" analyzed
PEIt = RIt - (c I + tPIRWt)
when all rates of return are in ex post terms. Prediction errors are tested for
statistically significant differences from zero with the following t-test tech-
nique:
Ltit
when
SE~t S 21+ 1+ - Rwt-Tw)2
n
t+1
with:
s2 = the variance of the market model residuals in the estimation period; and
n = the number of days in the estimation period.
In other words, SEI, is the square root of the estimated forecast variance for
day r in the analysis period. This test statistic has n-2 degrees of freedom and
is Student's t-distributed. The null and alternative statistical hypotheses to be
tested using the equation to determine SEI, are:
H.: EE ) =0
-L: E(PEIJ 0
"Event clustering" problems are avoided here by using portfolio results rather
than individual security returns. See Larry Y. Dann & Christopher M.James,
An Analysis of the Impact of Deposit Rate Ceilings on the Market Values of ThriftInstitutions, 37 J. FIN. 1259, 1272 (1982) (theorizing that portfolios are generally
diverse enough to avoid the impact of specific industry event clustering).
71 See infra Table One.
" See, e.g., Listed Options Quotations, WALL ST. J. Mar. 26, 1996, at C12
[hereinafter Listed Options]. The Dow Jones index for North America contains
aggregate stock market statistics for Canada, Mexico, and the United States.
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in this Article precludes use of computerized tape records. Thus,
all market data was gleaned from manual examinations of the
Wall Street Journal.
Tables Two, Three, Four, and Five build on the overall
market analysis presented in Table One by examining the impact
of the studied "events" on nine different sectors of the world
economy.1 Table Two examines prediction errors for economic
sectors in North America, while Table Three conducts the same
analysis for Asia.82 Table Four analyzes how industry sectors in
Europe reacted to events leading to the U.S. ratification of the
Uruguay Round, while Table Five focuses on the impact of these
events on economic sectors in domestic United States markets.83
The aggregate world market results are very interesting. There
are absolutely no significant or abnormal prediction errors, either
positive or negative, for Europe.8 4  The same is true for Mexi-
co.8" There are three abnormal returns for Canada, two positive,
and one strongly negative.86 There are also three abnormal
returns for the United States, two strongly negative and one
strongly positive. For the North American region as a whole,
including the United States, Canada, and Mexico, there are two
abnormal returns, one positive and one negative.88 These returns
demonstrate that securities markets in the world did not react
The Asia/Pacific index contains statistics from Australia, Hong Kong,
Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Singapore, South
Korea, and Thailand. The European index contains market data from: Austria,
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands,
Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. See id.
81 See id. The Dow Jones World Stock Index sets forth the following
sectors: basic industries (e.g., chemicals, metals, paper products); consum-
er/cyclical (e.g., apparel, retailers, media); industrial (e.g., railroad, trucking);
energy (e.g., oil companies, pipelines, coal); financiale.g., banks, insurance
companies); independent (e.g., conglomerates, overseas trading, plantations);
consumer/non-cyclical (e.g., pharmaceuticals, medical supplies, food);
technology (e.g., semiconductors, software, aerospace/defense); andutilities (e.g.,
telephone, water, electric). See id.
82 See infra Table Two.
83 See infra Tables Four and Five.
84 See infra Table One.
85 See id.
86 See id.
87 See id.
88 See id.
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conclusively, if at all, to positive events regarding the ratification
of the Uruguay Round.89
The only region in the world with an apparently clear reaction
to these events was the Asian/Pacific region. While this region
experienced only one significant prediction error, it was extremely
positive in nature.90
Given the anticipated widespread positive economic effects of
the Uruguay Round,91 these results are somewhat surprising.
They seem, however, to strongly confirm the earlier hypothesis
that the Uruguay Round will be the most beneficial for those na-
tions/regions that are going to be the strongest competitors in the
future.9 2  As noted, the Asian/Pacific region experienced the
most positive net wealth effect of the regions studied. Further-
more, the region's index is comprised of market data from
countries like Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Korea, and Japan,93
countries that rank at the very top of the index of future
competitiveness. 4
In contrast, markets in the United States showed no evidence
of positive wealth effects associated with the ratification of the
Uruguay Round of GATT.9s While ranking number one in the
world in terms of current competitiveness/GDP per capita,96 the
United States is only a middle-ranking future competitor.9 7
European countries, also ranked in the middle of the future
competitiveness charts,98 likewise showed no market reaction to
Uruguay Round ratification.9 In sum, the aggregate data seems
to confirm the theory that the impact of the Uruguay Round is
" See id. Prediction areas for all regions, whether normal or abnormal,
were balanced between positive and negative. Canada had more positive
prediction errors (eighteen out of thirty dates having positive signs) than any
other country in North America or the European region. See infra Table One.
' See infra Table One (showing a single prediction error of extreme
positive nature).
" See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text.
92 See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
9' See supra note 80.
9' See supra Chart Four.
9' See infra Table One.
96 See supra Chart One.
9' See supra Chart Four.
9' See supra Chart Four.
99 See infra Table One.
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going to be long-term in nature'O° and that future, rather than
present, competitors will be its greatest beneficiaries.
4.2. Sector Analysis
4.2.1. Overview
Although events surrounding Congressional ratification of the
Uruguay Round did not have a net wealth effect on the overall
market in the United States or other countries/regions, these
events did significantly impact certain economic sectors/industries
in these countries and regions.0 1 This section presents a sectoral
analysis of the data.
4.2.2. United States
While the studied events had no significant impact on U.S.
markets as a whole, the events did negatively impact certain
specific sectors of the U.S. economy." Not surprisingly, goods
of a consumer cyclical nature, including apparel, had a strong
negative prediction error.13 This is consistent with the negative
impact the gradual elimination of the MFA will have on the
apparel and related industries in the United States.0 4 It is also
consistent with the ITC Study's prediction of a sizable negative
trade effect for this and related U.S. industries as a result of the
Uruguay Round.0 5
The U.S. consumer non-cyclical sector, including the pharma-
ceutical industry, showed an unsurprising slightly positive net
reaction to the studied events.106 The Uruguay Round's intellec-
tual property protections should be a boon to U.S. pharmaceutical
manufacturers.' 7 The ITC Study predicted a major positive net
"00 See supra note 52 and accompanying text. To some extent, of course,
this is obvious since many of the Uruguay Round's key provisions, like the
elimination of the Multifiber Arrangement, don't completely phase in for five
or more years. See supra note 52.
'01 See infra Tables One to Five.
'02 See infra Table Five.
103 See infra Table Five.
104 See ITC Study supra note 31, at xix.
105 See ITC Study, supra note 31, at xx.
106 See infra Table Five.
17 See Trade Pact's Key Provisions, supra note 36, at A6 (stating that the
pharmaceutical industry should be the "clearest winner" in the trade agree-
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trade effect on this industry.'°8  The more modest positive
market reaction, though, may reflect fears that while the agree-
ment's intellectual property provisions represent a positive first
step, they need to be a lot stronger to really help U.S. holders of
valuable pharmaceutical patents and other intellectual proper-
ty.10
9
The overall flat reaction of the U.S. financial sector to the
agreement is also not surprising. ° While the Uruguay Round
failed to directly reach an agreement on the financial services
issue,"' it did include an explicit framework for future negotia-
tion on this and related trade-in-services subjects. 112 Thus, while
U.S. negotiators failed to secure immediate access for U.S. banks
and securities firms to Japan and other Asian countries where
markets are currently closed to them, the door has been somewhat
opened."'
A variety of other U.S. economic sectors, however, had
surprisingly negative market reactions to Uruguay Round ratifica-
tion events. Such reactions run counter to the ITC's generally
sanguine predictions for all U.S. industry under the Uruguay
Round."1 For example, the basic industries sector (including
chemicals, metals, and paper products) had a sharply negative
reaction, as did both the industrial (railroads, trucking, and
building materials) and technology sectors.1 These results tend
to signal that U.S. industry may face more competition from
ment).
108 See ITC Study, supra note 31, at xx.
109 See Boskin, supra note 15, at 138 (noting that the agreement reached in
the Uruguay Round provides better protection than the current practically non-
existent system); Many Business Leaders, supra note 34, at A6 (statement of Peter
Teeley, Vice President, Amgen, Inc., claiming that protections should be much
stronger).
... See infra Table Five.
'11 See Boskin, supra note 15, at 138 (admitting that the Uruguay Round
agreement has some shortcomings, including a failure on this account); Trade
Pact's Key Provisions, supra note 36, at A6 (listing the major provisions of the
Uruguay Round agreement).
112 See ITCStudy, supra note 31, at IX-5-6 (noting that future developments
in this area could greatly benefit certain U.S. service industries); Trade Pact's
Key Provisions, supra note 36, at A6 (stating that "negotiations would continue"
about financial services issues).
113 See Trade Pact's Key Provisions, supra note 36, at A6.
114 See ITC Study, supra note 31, at 1-9.
11 See infra Table Five.
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Asian and other countries under the Uruguay Round than
expected. In particular, the negative reaction in the technology
sector may illustrate the weakness of GATT's present intellectual
property protections, ostensibly intended to protect and help U.S.
software, semiconductor, and biotechnology companies. " "
4.2.3. North America
The sectoral results for North America in large measure mimic
those for the United States.117 The reactions of the basic indus-
tries (chemicals, metals) and technology sectors in North America
continue to be clearly negative, while the financial services sector
is flat."' Surprisingly, the consumer cyclical sector, including
apparel, is flat for North America as a whole while negative for
the United States." 9 This may, in part, indicate that the elimi-
nation of the MFA will negatively impact Mexico and Canada less
the United States.12" In contrast, the consumer/non-cyclical
sector, including the pharmaceutical industry, while showing
slightly positive abnormal returns for the United States, is flat for
North America as a whole.12 ' This may reflect some of the
benefits that the United States' strong pharmaceutical industry
will reap from the Uruguay Round's new intellectual property
protections." Overall, though, the results for North America
as a whole are very similar to those for the United States.
4.2.4. Europe
While overall market reaction in Europe to the studied events
was completely flat,1'2 sectoral analysis indicated flat to some-
what negative reactions./A There were no significant or abnor-
mal returns for the European basic industries, industrial, energy,
financial, consumer/non-cyclical, and utilities sectors. 2 The
116 See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
117 See infra Table Two.
118 See infra Table Two.
119 Compare infra Table Two with infra Table Five.
12. See supra notes 71-74 and accompanying text.
121 Compare infra Table Two with infra Table Five.
122 See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
12 See infra Table One.
14 See infra Table Four.
" See infra Table Four.
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European consumer/cyclical sector, including apparel, showed a
slightly negative reaction, which may once again be related to the
phasing out of the Multifiber Arrangement. 26 The sharpest
negative reaction in European markets, however, was in the
"independent" sector of the economy, which includes overseas
trading companies and conglomerates.1 27 These results appear
counterintuitive because companies of this kind should benefit
most from the generally liberalized world trade regime imple-
mented as part of the Uruguay Round.12' The empirical results
appear to indicate, however, that European-based companies of
this kind may be comparatively weaker future competitors under
the post-Uruguay Round economic construct. 129  The same
assertion may hold true for the European technology sector,
which also experienced a clear negative reaction to the studied
events. 
130
4.2.5. Asia
Sectoral reaction in the Asian/Pacific region to the studied
events was extremely positive, confirming the overall positive
reaction in Asian/Pacific markets.131  Clear positive abnormal
returns were found for the consumer/cyclical, industrial, energy,
financial, consumer/non-cyclical, and technology sectors. 132 The
remaining sectors (basic industries, independent, and utilities) were
basically flat.133 There were no abnormal or significant negative
returns for any Asian/Pacific economic sector."3 The strongest
positive significant returns were for the Asian financial and
consumer/non-cyclical sectors. 13' The strong positive returns
for the financial services sector in Asia makes considerable sense
126 See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
127 See infra Table Four.
128 See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text.
129 See supra Chart Four.
130 See supra Chart Four. See generally Terence Roth and Bhushan Bahree,
Europe, Despite Rising Joblessness, Isn't Likely to Turn to Protectionism, WALL ST.
J., Apr. 1, 1996, at A9 (discussing problems the European economy has had in
competing in the new, post-WTO, globalized world economy).
131 See infra Table Three.
132 See infra Table Three.
133 See infra Table Three.
131 See infra Table Three.
131 See infra Table Three.
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given the success, as noted above, of Japanese and other Asian
negotiators in keeping this sector of the Asian economy mostly
closed to foreign competition. 36 While the Uruguay Round
agreement does put the issue of more open trade in financial
services "on the table," that is the limit of its accomplishments in
this area.17  In the meantime, Japanese and other Asian banks,
securities firms, and other financial institutions remain largely free
from competition from American and other foreign institu-
tions.1
31
The very strong positive reaction in the Asian consumer/non-
cyclical economic sector, which includes the pharmaceutical and
other industries,139 is somewhat more puzzling. The data seem
to suggest that Asian/Pacific countries are in a unique position to
profit in this sector.'4°  For example, the agreement's new
intellectual property provisions may hurt various developing
countries by forcing them to pay much higher prices for drugs
and other goods. The developed and newly industrialized
countries of the Asian/Pacific region, however, are probably in a
position to benefit from stronger intellectual property rules.141
This situation should help spur even greater Asian/Pacific research
and development activity.142  Moreover, some Asian/Pacific
countries, like Malaysia, 43 already have strict rules regarding the
protection of intellectual property. The Uruguay Round removes
any comparative advantage other countries currently enjoy over
them in this regard. Consequently, Malaysia will become an even
stronger Asian competitor in the future.'4
136 See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
137 See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
13. See supra note 50 and accompanying text; see also Trade Pact's Key
Provisions, supra note 36, at A6 (noting that U.S. negotiators failed to gain
access for U.S. banks and securities firms in Japan and several Southeastern
Asian nations).
139 See infra Table Three.
140 See KRUEGER, supra note 38, at 53. This is because of the Uruguay
Round's new phase-in intellectual property protections and its overall easing of
export barriers. See id.
141 See id. at 53 & n.30.
142 See id. at 53
143 See id. at 53 n.30.
144 See generally id. at 53 n.30 (noting that "besides the direct cost of higher
prices, developing countries will be financing the foreign exchange cost ofthe
larger royalty payments"). Malaysia ranked second only to Singapore as the
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5. CONCLUSION
The Uruguay Round agreement of the GATT/WTO is
perhaps the most important event in recent world economic
history. Our event study analysis, however, shows that securities
markets throughout the world did not react equally to the
agreement. While the overall Asian/Pacific market as well as
numerous industrial sectors in that market reacted extremely
positively to the accord, reactions in markets in Europe and
North America were basically flat to slightly negative. The long-
term nature of the impact of the Uruguay Round on the world
economy likely contributed in large measure to our empirical
findings. Many of the agreement's provisions, such as its
elimination of the world MFA, will not be fully phased in for up
to a decade. Moreover, even after all the agreement's provisions
become fully implemented it will take numerous years for their
economic impact to be fully felt. Consequently, the agreement
will probably most benefit those countries and regions which are
in the best "competitive" position a decade or two into the future.
A recent comprehensive analysis of "future competitiveness" gave
the highest scores in this regard to Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand,
China, Japan, and Korea, with scores for North America and
European countries generally lagging far behind. Consequently,
the empirical results of our study appear to provide hard evidence
corroborating the perceived positive economic benefit the
Uruguay Round of the GATT/WTO will bring to the
Asian/Pacific region of the world.
top future competitor in the world. See supra Chart Four.
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TABLE 1
Abnormal Returns Around Announcement Dates for GATT:
Aggregate Average Results for Selected Countries and Regions?
Aug 15 Sep 21 Sep 30 Nov 22 Nov 29 Dec 2
-2 0.0040 -0.0050 0.0023 -0.0030 0.0043 0.0017
-1 -0.0047 0.0015 0.0043 -0.0021 0.0053 -0.0048
Day 0 0.0067 -0.0138* -0.0036 -0.0042 0.0023 -0.0057
+1 -0.0007 -0.0031 0.0027 -0.0098 0.0017 0.0104*
+2 0.0067 0.0019 -0.0001 0.0043 -0.0048 -0.0026
-2 0.0046 -0.0058 0.0026 -0.0026 0.0043 0.0013
-1 -0.0049 0.0013 0.0051 -0.0017 0.0052 -0.0050
Day 0 0.0074 -0.0146*** -0.0032 -0.0040 0.0022 -0.0061
+1 -0.0008 -0.0031 0.0026 -0.0108" 0.0013 0.0113*
+2 0.0064 0.0018 0.0007 0.0043 -0.0050 -0.0024
North America
U.S.
Canada
Mexico
Asia
Europe
-2 -0.0074 0.0016
-1 0.0065 0.0048
Day 0 0.0114 -0.0041
+1 0.0055 0.0135
+2 0.0153 0.0085
-0.0068 -0.0159
-0.0206 -0.0117
-0.0147 -0.0026
0.0114 0.0169
-0.0177 -0.0011
-2 -0.0003 0.0045 -0.0073 0.0042
-1 0.0049 -0.0003 -0.0050 0.0008
Day 0 -0.0047 0.0192** 0.0077 0.0001
+1 0.0004 0.0030 -0.0036 0.0086
+2 -0.0048 0.0004 0.0037 -0.0038
-2 -0.0052 0.0010 0.0130 -0.0017
-1 0.0007 -0.0024 0.0015 0.0017
Day 0 -0.0030 -0.0069 -0.0063 0.0060
+1 0.0005 0.0004 0.0013 0.0011
+2 -0.0024 0.0030 -0.0058 -0.0019
0.0134* 0.0031
0.0023 -0.0042
-0.0052 0.0038
0.0031 0.0070
-0.0043 -0.0011
-0.0011 0.0128
0.0176 -0.0023
0.0254 -0.0201
0.0128 -0.0089
-0.0023 -0.0020
-0.0038 0.0005
-0.0046 0.0025
-0.0008 0.0047
0.0005 -0.0103
0.0025 0.0020
-0.0019 -0.0026
-0.0011 0.0049
-0.0015 0.0011
-0.0026 -0.0017
0.0049 0.0028
'Asterisks indicate level of significance for t tests of abnormal returns' diffrence from zero: *-.10,
**-.05, *** --01.
-2 0.0034 0.0075 0.0035 -0.0038
-1 -0.0100 0.0108 0.0028 -0.0014
Day 0 0.0024 -0.0150* -0.0008 -0.0058
+1 0.0001 -0.0017 -0.0011 0.0037
+2 0.0071 0.0038 0.0010 0.0134"
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TABLE 2
Abnormal Returns Around Announcement Dates for GATT: North America
Sectors of the Economy Aug 15 Sep 21 Sep 30 Nov 22 Nov 29 Dec 2
Basic Industries
-2 0.0004 0.0054 0.0059 -0.0063 -0.0016 0.0039
-1 -0.0103 0.0109 0.0072 -0.0064 0.0075 0.0063
Day 0 -0.0019 -0.0132- -0.0024 -0.0066 0.0010 -0.0045
+1 -0.0034 -0.0049 -0.0024 -0.0170" 0.0039 0.0111
+2 0.0014 0.0020 -0.0023 -0.0016 0.0063 -0.0019
Consumer Cyclical -2 0.0018 -0.0054 0.0027 -0.0081 0.0084 0.0016
-1 -0.0016 -0.0002 0.0045 0.0001 0.0013 -0.0062
Day 0 0.0047 -0.0153 -0.0063 -0.0044 0.0037 -0.0095
+1 -0.0011 -0.0072 0.0042 -0.0065 0.0016 0.0105
+2 0.0118 0.0013 0.0026 0.0084 -0.0062 -0.0049
Industrial
-2 -0.0013 -0.0055 0.0052 -0.0054 -0.0016 0.0030
-1 -0.0058 0.0003 0.0003 -0.0580 0.0061 0.0022
Day 0 0.0079 -0.0127- -0.0028 -0.0062 0.0037 -0.0034
+1 -0.0014 -0.0073 0.0018 -0.0126* 0.0030 0.0085
+2 0.0063 0.0006 -0.0041 -0.0016 0.0022 -0.0027
Energy -2 0.0029 -0.0116 -0.0014 0.0002 -0.0040 0.0017
-1 -0.0105 0.0007 0.0056 -0.0064 0.0027 -0.0067
Day 0 0.0112 -0.0139- -0.0017 0.0058 0.0027 -0.0066
+1 -0.0058 -0.0038 0.0037 -0.0015 0.0017 0.0053
+2 -0.0047 0.0041 0.0040 -0.0040 -0.0067 -0.0111
Financial
-2 0.0018 -0.0063 -0.0036 -0.0106 0.0250 0.0033
-1 -0.0049 -0.0049 0.0038 -0.0070 0.0058 -0.0077
Day 0 0.0093 -0.0195- -0.0043 -0.0127" -0.0015 -0.0014
+1 -0.0002 -0.0022 -0.0003 -0.0092 0.0033 0.0112"
+2 0.0060 -0.0010 -0.0034 0.0250- -0.0077 0.0010
Independent -2 -0.0132 -0.0005 -0.0080 -0.0066 -0.0076 -0.0129
-1 -0.0109 -0.0114 0.0023 -0.0006 0.0037 -0.0127
Day 0 0.0066 -0.0177- -0.0005 -0.0165- 0.0188* -0.0064
+1 0.0103 0.0029 -0.0083 -0.0195* -0.0129 0.0302**
+2 0.0028 -0.0059 -0.0073 -0.0076 -0.0127 -0.0053
ConsumerfNon-cyclical -2 0.0131 -0.0075 0.0059 0.0001 -0.0014 0.0002
-1 -0.0026 0.0071 0.0048 0.0030 0.0031 -0.0038
Day 0 0.0128- -0.0111"* -0.0059 -0.0048 0.0066 -0.0049
+1 0.0023 -0.0003 0.0064 -0.0135* 0.0002 0.0098*
+2 0.0123 0.0051 0.0069 -0.0014 -0.0038 -0.0038
Technology -2 0.0085 -0.0004 0.0021 0.0034 -0.0033 0.0072
-1 -0.0008 0.0003 -0.0011 0.0010 0.0067 -0.0100
Day 0 -0.0011 -0.0124 0.0011 -0.0062 0.0010 -0.0095
+1 -0.0011 -0.0041 0.0020 -0.0225*** 0.0072 0.0117
+2 0.0113 -0.0017 -0.0043 -0.0033 -0.0100 0.0012
Utilities
-2 0.0015 -0.0073 0.0070 0.0002 0.0169.* -0.0028
-1 -0.0054 0.0023 0.0071 -0.0047 0.0054 -0.0027
Day 0 0.0070 -0.0115 -0.0040 0.0065 -0.0040 -0.0048
+1 -0.0017 0.0004 0.0035 0.0068 -0.0028 0.0076
+2 0.0006 0.0056 -0.0036 0.0169*** -0.0027 0.0016
'Asterisks indicate level of significance for t tests of abnormal returns' difference from zero: *-.10,
*-.05, -*-.01.
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TABLE 3
Abnormal Returns Around Announcement Dates for GATT: Asia
Sectors of the Economy Aug 15 Sep 21 Sep 30 Nov 22 Nov 29 Dec 2
Basic Industries
Consumer Cyclical
Industrial
Energy
Financial
Independent
Consumer/Non-cyclical
Technology
Utilities
-2 0.0018 0.0031
-1 0.0038 0.0026
Day 0 -0.0025 0.0222**
+1 0.0032 0.0050
+2 -0.0013 0.0066
-2 0.0007 0.0037
-1 0.0045 -0.0034
Day 0 -0.0062 0.0205**
+1 -0.0016 0.0018
+2 -0.0053 0.0031
-2 -0.0024 0.0026
-1 0.0062 -0.0003
Day 0 -0.0042 0.0205**
+1 0.0002 0.0021
+2 -0.0052 -0.0002
-2 0.0036 0.0081
-1 0.0057 0.0001
Day 0 -0.0016 0.0169*
+1 -0.0041 -0.0020
+2 -0.0051 0.0027
-2 -0.0018 0.0048
-1 0.0038 -0.0007
Day 0 -0.0047 0.0189**
+1 0.0023 0.0046
+2 -0.0052 -0.0009
-2 0.0064 0.0082
-1 -0.0005 -0.0024
Day 0 -0.0056 0.0128
+1 -0.0004 -0.0004
+2 -0.0040 -0.0043
-2 0.0006 0.0021
-1 0.0059 0.0029
Day 0 -0.0043 0.0159**
+1 -0.0006 0.0003
+2 -0.0049 -0.0032
-2 -0.0061 0.0021
-1 0.0032 0.0020
Day 0 -0.0056 0.0234*
+1 -0.0011 0.0038
+2 -0.0086 -0.0030
-2 0.0055 0.0129
-1 0.0125 -0.0001
Day 0 -0.0060 0.0099
+1 -0.0014 0.0028
+2 -0.0030 0.0025
-0.0061 0.0062 -0.0005 -0.0077
-0.0070 0.0014 -0.0058 0.0042
0.0103 0.0013 -0.0008 -0.0024
-0.0024 0.0088 -0.0077 -0.0175*
0.0003 -0.0005 0.0042 -0.0003
-0.0089 0.0053 -0.0075 -0.0012
-0.0060 0.0002 -0.0046 0.0029
0.0086 -0.0021 -0.0031 0.0016
-0.0043 0.0065 -0.0012 -0.0106
0.0020 -0.0075 0.0029 0.0039
-0.0081 0.0055 -0.0036 -0.0032
-0.0058 0.0025 -0.0085 0.0038
0.0077 0.0005 -0.0008 -0.0017
-0.0027 0.0087 -0.0032 -0.0107
0.0036 -0.0036 0.0038 0.0011
-0.0153 0.0021 0.0073 -0.0058
-0.0091 0.0041 -0.0056 -0.0001
0.0167" -0.0063 0.0036 0.0052
-0.0071 0.0166* -0.0058 -0.0143
0.0094 0.0073 -0.0001 0.0035
-0.0090 0.0011 0.0016 0.0068
-0.0005 -0.0012 -0.0016 0.0030
0.0063 0.0007 0.0006 0.0146**
-0.0034 0.0057 0.0068 -0.0087
0.0057 0.0016 0.0030 0.0022
-0.0058 -0.0005 -0.0095 -0.0022
-0.0050 0.0029 0.0004 -0.0014
0.0099 -0.0004 -0.0016 0.0025
-0.0059 -0.0037 -0.0220 -0.0152
0.0039 -0.0095 -0.0014 -0.0021
-0.0054 0.0069 -0.0015 -0.0018
-0.0083 0.0023 -0.0063 0.0129*
0.0041 0.0006 -0.0012 0.0025
-0.0001 0.0087 -0.0018 -0.0098
0.0049 -0.0015 0.0129* 0.0053
0.0017 0.0078 -0.0043 0.0011
-0.0104 -0.0011 -0.0099 -0.0050
0.0111 -0.0037 0.0002 0.0050
-0.0090 0.0108 0.0011 -0.0081
0.0013 -0.0043 -0.0050 0.0009
-0.0009 0.0032 -0.0055 0.0009
-0.0078 0.0035 -0.0021 -0.0050
-0.0005 0.0053 -0.0034 -0.0036
0.0002 0.0101 0.0009 -0.0080
0.0030 -0.0055 -0.0050 -0.0004
'Asterisks indicate level of significance for r tests of abnormal returns' difference from zero: *-.10,
**-05, *** -.01.
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol17/iss3/2
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TABLE 4
Abnormal Returns Around Announcement Dates for GATT: Europe
Sectors of the Economy Aug 15 Sep 21 Sep 30 Nov 22 Nov 29 Dec 2
Basic Industries
Consumer Cyclical
Industrial
Energy
Financial
Independent
Consumer/Non-cyclical
-2 -0.0044 0.0047 0.0047
-1 0.0003 -0.0060 -0.0016
Day 0 -0.0067 -0.0046 -0.0040
+1 0.0027 -0.0005 -0.0061
+2 -0.0067 -0.0012 -0.0056
-2 -0.0051 0.0001 0.0054
-1 0.0005 -0.0060 0.0004
Day 0 -0.0053 -0.0079 -0.0109"
+1 -0.0017 -0.0023 0.0014
+2 -0.0041 0.0010 -0.0043
-2 -0.0078 0.0013 0.0070
-1 -0.0026 -0.0049 -0.0026
Day 0 -0.0049 -0.0074 -0.0093
+1 -0.0017 -0.0015 -0.0004
+2 -0.0025 0.0033 -0.0060
-2 -0.0061 -0.0046 0.0029
-1 0.0016 -0.0050 -0.0035
Day 0 -0.0044 -0.0093 -0.0032
+1 0.0011 -0.0022 0.0039
+2 -0.0088 -0.0060 0.0001
-2 -0.0078 0.0022 0.0080
-1 -0.0017 -0.0029 0.0010
Day 0 -0.0086 -0.0077 -0.0059
+1 -0.0025 0.0023 0.0005
+2 -0.0020 0.0008 -0.0093
-2 -0.0023 0.0051 0.0101
-1 -0.0018 -0.0104 0.0033
Day 0 -0.0007 -0.0137* -0.0157""
+1 0.0003 -0.0056 0.0008
+2 -0.0049 0.0040 -0.0074
-2 -0.0005 -0.0049 0.0079
-1 0.0043 0.0010 0.0003
Day 0 0.0075 -0.0082 -0.0040
+1 0.0013 -0.0018 0.0001
+2 -0.0015 0.0042 -0.0097
-0.0062 -0.0037 -0.0083
-0.0003 -0.0030 0.0013
0.0024 -0.0031 -0.0015
-0.0019 -0.0083 -0.0048
-0.0037 0.0013 0.0050
-0.0022 -0.0090 -0.0059
-0.0005 -0.0046 0.0048
0.0050 -0.0040 -0.0043
-0.0010 -0.0059 -0.0067
-0.0090 0.0048 -0.0003
-0.0031 -0.0047 -0.0057
0.0021 -0.0019 0.0023
0.0062 -0.0028 -0.0008
-0.0004 -0.0057 -0.0073
-0.0047 0.0023 -0.0009
-0.0021 -0.0008 0.0026
-0.0021 -0.0016 0.0070
0.0069 -0.0048 -0.0042
-0.0040 0.0026 -0.0001
-0.0008 0.0070 -0.0028
-0.0022 0.0016 -0.0026
0.0016 -0.0015 0.0050
0.0038 -0.0011 0.0024
0.0003 -0.0026 0.0001
0.0015 0.0050 0.0057
-0.0047 -0.0188- 0.0019
0.0019 -0.0018 -0.0014
0.0042 0.0009 0.0031
-0.0002 0.0019 -0.0058
-0.0188- -0.0014 0.0044
-0.0029 -0.0020 -0.0014
0.0001 -0.0013 0.0037
0.0046 -0.0008 -0.0035
0.0013 -0.0014 -0.0024
-0.0020 0.0037 0.0041
-2 -0.0129 -0.0015 0.0091 -0.0060 0.0040 -0.0134
-1 0.0021 -0.0058 0.0009 -0.0043 -0.0015 0.0039
Day 0 -0.0134 -0.0078 -0.0321** 0.0040 -0.0031 0.0059
+1 0.0005 0.0029 -0.0012 -0.0056 -0.0134 -0.0023
+2 -0.0008 0.0040 -0.0042 0.0040 0.0039 0.0039
Uilities
-2 -0.0108 0.0003 0.0074 -0.0010 -0.0111 -0.0015
-1 -0.0030 -0.0039 0.0106 0.0015 0.0006 0.0083
Day 0 -0.0099 -0.0085 -0.0063 0.0044 -0.0014 0.0025
+1 -0.0015 -0.0012 0.0007 -0.0062 -0.0015 -0.0027
+2 0.0001 0.0039 -0.0121 -0.0111 0.0083 -0.0009
'Asterisks indicate level of significance for t tests of abnormal returns' difference from zero: -. 10,
**-.05, ***--.1
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TABLE 5
Abnormal Returns Around Announcement Dates for GATT: U.S.a
Sectors of the Economy Aug 15 Sep 21 Sep 30 Nov 22 Nov 29 
Dec 2
Basic Industries
Consumer Cyclical
Industrial
Energy
Financial
Independent
Consumer/Non-cyclica
-2 0.0006 0.0039 0.0047 -0.0053 -0.0025 0.0019
-1 -0.0101 0.0086 0.0094 -0.0053 0.0071 0.0080
Day 0 -0.0015 -0.0154* -0.0023 -0.0059 0.0022 -0.0074
+1 -0.0041 -0.0064 -0.0026 -0.0212** 0.0019 0.0112
+2 0.0007 0.0015 -0.0014 -0.0025 0.0080 -0.0011
-2 0.0023 -0.0057 0.0020 -0.0083 0.0030 0.0011
-1 -0.0016 -0.0005 0.0056 0.0002 0.0066 -0.0064
Day 0 0.0045 -0.0165** -0.0064 -0.0041 0.0032 -0.0101
+1 -0.0014 -0.0074 0.0051 -0.0080 0.0011 0.0112
+2 0.0114 0.0011 -0.0101 0.0030 -0.0064 -0.0048
-2 -0.0004 -0.0066 0.0004 -0.0052 -0.0012 0.0012
-1 -0.0083 0.0003 0.0091 -0.0055 0.0061 0.0027
Day 0 0.0079 -0.0153** -0.0008 -0.0091 -0.0001 -0.0038
+1 -0.0019 -0.0081 0.0011 -0.0153" 0.0012 0.0097
+2 0.0050 -0.0007 -0.0012 -0.0012 0.0027 -0.0019
-2 0.0031 -0.0121 -0.0014 0.0010 -0.0038 0.0019
-1 -0.0108 0.0008 0.0056 -0.0058 0.0027 -0.0073
Day 0 0.0117 -0.0144" -0.0016 0.0070 0.0029 -0.0061
+1 -0.0058 -0.0039 0.0038 -0.0008 0.0019 0.0058
+2 -0.0051 0.0044 0.0045 -0.0038 -0.0073 -0.0115
-2 0.0014 -0.0064 -0.0040 -0.0112 0.0241- 0.0036
-1 -0.0043 -0.0056 0.0035 -0.0075 0.0055 -0.0080
Day 0 0.0094 -0.0204*** -0.0043 -0.0135"* -0.0013 -0.0017
+1 -0.0006 -0.0017 -0.0005 -0.0102 0.0036 0.0117
+2 0.0056 -0.0014 -0.0032 0.0241*** -0.0080 0.0006
-2 -0.0132 -0.0005 -0.0080 -0.0067 -0.0076 -0.0129
-1 -0.0109 -0.0114 0.0024 -0.0005 0.0037 -0.0128
Day 0 0.0066 -0.0177" -0.0004 -0.0165" 0.0188* -0.0058
+1 0.0104 0.0029 -0.0083 -0.0194** -0.0129 0.0391"**
+2 0.0028 -0.0059 -0.0073 -0.0076 -0.0128 -0.0051
-2 0.0140* -0.0079 0.0063 0.0002 -0.0016 0.0000
-1 -0.0022 0.0070 0.0051 0.0033 0.0032 -0.0039
Day 0 0.0128"* -0.0114* -0.0058 -0.0048 0.0068 -0.0053
+1 0.0021 0.0000 0.0063 -0.0142* 0.0000 0.0103"
+2 0.0124"* 0.0052 0.0072 -0.0016 -0.0039 -0.0039
Technology -2 0.0084 -0.0013 0.0023 0.0037 -0.0036 0.0071
-1 -0.0004 0.0005 -0.0016 0.0014 0.0069 -0.0101
Day 0 -0.0014 -0.0124 0.0012 -0.0061 0.0012 -0.0098
+1 -0.0013 -0.0043 0.0020 -0.0230*** 0.0071 0.0115
+2 0.0110 -0.0019 -0.0047 -0.0036 -0.0101 0.0015
Utilities -2 0.0021 -0.0095 0.0084 0.0016 0.0180* -0.0037
-1 -0.0057 0.0025 0.0091 -0.0049 0.0049 -0.0026
Day 0 0.0061 -0.0124 -0.0040 0.0081 -0.0054 -0.0057
+1 -0.0009 0.0006 0.0033 0.0060 -0.0037 0.0096
+2 -0.0006 0.0054 -0.0033 0.0180* -0.0026 0.0016
aAsterisks indicate level of significance for t tests of abnormal returns' difference from zero: *-.10,
**-.05, ***-.01.
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol17/iss3/2
